Tourism crisis: management and recovery in tourist-reliant





Tourism crisis: Management and 
recovery in tourist-reliant 
destinations
Yetta Gurtner 
Tourism and travel for leisure are by no means new pursuits. With 
technological innovations and increased discretionary income over the past 
sixty years, such activities have rapidly generated a global industry. 
Renowned for stimulating social and economic growth tourism has also 
become a motivational force for development in many diverse locations.  As 
a destination or specific host-community becomes more reliant on the 
opportunities and revenues generated from the tourism sector, it 
exponentially increases its vulnerability to a potential tourism crisis. Given 
that the successful tourism enterprise is based on both physical and 
intangible qualities, the associated hazards are innumerable.  Recent events 
such as the violent terrorist attacks in Bali highlight the relevance of crisis 
management strategies in facilitating the process of both community and 
destination recovery.
Tourism and Development 
With growing access, services, opportunity and demand, tourism has rapidly 
become a prosperous and dynamic global industry.  The World Tourism 
Organisation (WTO, 2002) defines tourism in the following manner: 
…comprises the activities of persons travelling to and staying in places 
outside their usual environment for not more than one consecutive 
year for leisure, business and other purposes not related to the 
exercise of an activity remunerated from within the place visited (p. 1).  
Although such a definition establishes the capacity of a tourist, it fails to 
elaborate on the business or occupation of tourism, including, the 
economics, the infrastructure and even the role of associated stakeholders. 
As an industry, tourism encompasses much more than the activities of the 
visitor.
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McIntosh and Goeldner (1986) describe tourism as an interactive process, it 
is “the sum of the phenomena and relationships arising from the interaction 
of tourists, business suppliers, host governments, and host communities in 
the process of attracting and hosting these tourists and other visitors” (p. 4). 
Tangible elements include transport, accommodation, food, environment 
and entertainment facilities, while the more intangible elements may involve 
culture, hospitality, ambience and relaxation.  With increasing foreign 
exchange earnings and revenues over the past few decades, tourism has 
become the world’s largest growth industry, comprising over 10.6% of global 
GDP and generating the equivalent of one in every twelve jobs (World Travel 
and Tourism Council, WTTC, 2005). 
Given such lucrative fiscal and employment potential, tourism has been 
widely promoted as a catalyst for economic and social development.  As a 
labour intensive industry, a successful tourism endeavour can create 
significant income and job opportunities in both the formal and informal 
sectors.  Associated investments often stimulate new and improved 
infrastructure, including transport networks, utilities, sanitation and medical 
facilities.  While many facilities are intended to advance tourism prospects, 
such services may also improve the general standard of living for proximate 
residents.  Governments can also profit because of related trade 
opportunities, foreign receipts and tax revenues generated through travel 
and tourism.  As a source of such opportunities, the promotion and 
development of tourism has proved attractive to many destinations – 
whether at the country, state, region, city or town level (Bierman, 2003). 
Tourism-reliant destinations 
While the nature of tourism in any locality depends on both dynamics and 
scale, much of the industry appears to have been developed with limited 
consideration to long-term sustainability (UNEP, 2002). In many 
destinations, particularly within developing nations, rapid and uncontrolled 
growth of the tourism sector has already resulted in significant social, 
cultural and environmental consequences. Although tourism enterprise may 
generate tangible financial prosperity for many stakeholders, growing 
dependence on such trade can actually increase the risks of experiencing 
future adversity. 
Lured by the apparent economic prospects and incentives, individuals, 
businesses, service providers and even the governments within host 
communities often realign activities to conduct and openly support tourism. 
More traditional pursuits such as agriculture and manufacturing may be 
abandoned in favour of tourism-related employment, and consequently the 
economy becomes increasingly less diversified.  Pertinent resources, both 
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natural and cultural, are often appropriated as a consequence of tourist 
demands, with limited public consultation or future recourse.  The more a 
destination becomes contingent on the demands and fortunes of the tourism 
industry without consideration to sustainable development, the greater the 
level of socio-economic vulnerability (Glaesser, 2003). 
The vulnerability of tourism 
Historically, tourism development has proved to be a sensitive, erratic and 
precarious undertaking. It is in its capacity to offer so many options and 
easily accommodate changes in consumer desires, that the fragility of the 
tourist market and the vulnerability of dependant destinations are revealed. 
As a voluntary activity, travellers have the discretion to simply cancel plans, 
postpone trips or opt for alternative destinations.  The motivations behind 
variations in market demand can be diverse as economics, trends or even a 
shift in demographics.  However, the research conducted by numerous 
academics and industry professionals (Cavlek, 2002; Pizam & Mansfield, 
1996) have clearly established that sudden and radical adjustments to travel 
plans are regularly instigated by a change in destination image and public 
perceptions of safety and risk.  
In their book Tourism, Crime and International Security, editors Pizam and 
Mansfield (1996, p. 1) reassert the popular premise that “safety, tranquillity 
and peace are a necessary prerequisite for prosperous tourism”. While there 
are many elements that may influence destination choice, consumer 
decisions are strongly based on an assessment of the level of personal risk 
(Bar-On, 1996).  The perceived risks may entail the chance of disruption of 
planned activities, crime, property loss and/or damage, exposure to danger, 
injury or even death. A variety of external factors including media coverage, 
travel advisories, business, economics, peer pressure and insurance policies; 
may also help persuade or prejudice the subjective process of risk 
assessment and evaluation. The more a destination is publicly associated 
with an adverse threat or hazard, whether real or perceived, the greater the 
likelihood of consumers making alternative arrangements.   
Tourism and hazards 
There have been numerous typologies regarding the sources of risks for 
tourism businesses and destinations (WTO, 2003; PATA, 2003; Shaluf, 
Ahmadun & Said, 2003; Faulkner, 2001), however, much of the popular 
literature employs the generic classifications of natural, human induced and 
technological hazards.  A natural hazard may be climatological (e.g. flood, 
drought, extreme cold, hurricane, cyclone, wildfire) or geophysical (e.g. 
earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, avalanche, tsunami).  Human-
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induced events are as varied and diverse as transport accidents, crime, 
political instability, terrorism, war, industrial action and epidemic diseases.  
Although not as widely covered in tourism studies, technological hazards 
may entail mechanical/systems failure, industrial and even nuclear 
accidents. If it had been substantiated the Y2K (millennium bug) had the 
potential to disrupt computer travel and booking procedures, transport and 
navigational equipment and even the supply of amenities on an almost 
global scale.  
While the threat of any such hazard agent may generate public 
apprehension, a hazard does not necessarily result in a definitive “event” or 
incident. With adequate warnings, preparation and contingency plans it may 
be possible to avert or eliminate a prospective hazard, or to effectively 
minimise the level of actual damage sustained.  Irrespective of the level of 
awareness or planning however, experience consistently demonstrates that 
not all hazards may be accurately forecast or avoided (Faulkner, 2001). 
Given the complex social, economic and environmental context in which a 
host community fosters tourism development, the impacts and consequence 
to a hazard-afflicted tourist destination can be highly unpredictable and 
highly differential.  An environment of physical exposure, poverty, high 
urbanisation, poor social dynamics and unsafe conditions (vulnerability) 
typically enhance both the degree and severity of adverse impacts 
(WHO/EHA, 2002). 
Tourists themselves are often more susceptible to direct danger due to 
reduced alertness, limited local hazard knowledge and less familiarity with 
the resources that can be relied upon to ensure their personal safety 
(Faulkner, 2001). In an emergency situation, immediate response and relief 
efforts are generally determined by the extent of local coping capacity and 
resources.  
Direct hazard impacts may include injuries, fatalities, evacuation, extensive 
damage (physical, environmental and social) and substantial economic costs 
(Shaluf, Ahmadun & Said, 2003).  The scope may be localised to a single 
business, destination, or affect an entire geographic region. Beyond the more 
apparent physical effects, many hazard agents also generate indirect and 
‘ripple effect’ consequences which can lead to longer-term issues. Associated 
reconstruction costs and travel market instability has the potential to 
generate significant social and economic repercussions for any tourist-reliant 
operatives. Depending on the variables measured, evaluative criteria, and 
conceptual definitions applied, such hazard events have been variably 
referred to as accidents, emergencies, disasters and/or crises (Shaluf, 
Ahmadun & Said, 2003).   
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Tourism crisis 
Rather than employing a definitive scale or quantitative approach, the WTO 
(2003) defines crisis (as it pertains to tourism) as “any unexpected event that 
affects traveller confidence in a destination and interferes with the ability to 
continue operating normally” (p. 1).  Sonmez, Apostolopoulos and Tarlow 
(1999) utilise the more comprehensive term of ‘tourism crisis’ to describe 
circumstances: 
which can threaten the normal operation and conduct of tourism-
related businesses; damage a tourist destination’s overall 
reputation for safety, attractiveness, and comfort by negatively 
affecting visitor’s perceptions of that destination; and, in turn, 
cause a downturn in the local travel and tourism economy and 
interrupt the continuity of business operations for the local travel 
and tourism industry, by the reduction in tourist arrivals and 
expenditures…  
(pp. 13-14). 
Given such definitions, it becomes evident that unlike an accident, 
emergency or disaster, a tourism crisis is not necessarily precipitated by the 
threat of a real and imminent danger, or the direct physical impact of a 
hazard agent.  While natural and human-induced incidents seem to be the 
most abundant instances, tourism crisis may be triggered by external and 
less tangible factors that adversely affect destination image, such as 
proximate regional instability, rumour and bad publicity. As it remains 
feasibly and logistically impossible to insulate against every such 
contingency, no tourism destination can ever be completely immune from 
crisis (Bierman, 2003). 
While the repercussions of the tragic terrorist attacks of September 2001 and 
outbreak of SARS (Sudden Acute Respiratory Syndrome) confirm that the 
entire tourism industry is sensitive to the turbulence and instability of crisis, 
some destinations and host communities remain more disposed to 
experience adversity. Although it is impossible to eliminate every risk, it is 
apparent that to minimise susceptibility to such crises, such destination 
stakeholders need to implement greater initiatives towards vulnerability 
reduction, consistent with effective crisis management. 
Developing tourism crisis management strategies  
The relative frequency and high profile of such recent international events 
has resulted in increasing industry and academic attention towards the 










on an amalgam of disaster and business management principles such 
initiatives are intended to minimise any negative destination impacts and 
help retain the confidence of both travellers and the travel industry (WTO, 
2003; Bierman, 2003; PATA, 2003). As with an integrated disaster 
management approach, a tourism crisis management framework is generally 
premised on the continuum of risk reduction and response (refer to Figure 
6.1).  While the terminology often varies, the proactive phases before the 
‘crisis trigger’ include assessment, prevention/reduction, mitigation and 
readiness/preparedness. Post-event stages include response/relief, 
rehabilitation, and recovery/reconstruction.  
Ideally, the experiences and lessons learnt from any preceding crisis would 
be used in mitigating future contingencies.  
Figure 6.1 The crisis management continuum
Source: Adapted from WHO/EHA, 2002 
Founded on extensive industry experience PATA’s (2003) generic planning 
guide Crisis: It won’t happen to us! reveals that in the case of tourism, the 
nature of the event/issue, visibility, the number, age and prominence of 
people involved, and the level of associated media attention commonly 
influences the extent and duration of subsequent crises. Given the 
importance of maintaining a low risk perception and positive image, similar 
popular destination crisis management plans also highlight facets of 
communications, safety and security, market research and promotion (WTO, 
2003).  While formal crisis management initiatives are often resourced and 
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planned at the business, government or organisational level, a holistic 
approach suggests that the development of a comprehensive strategy for the 
tourism sector be co-ordinated between all relevant stakeholders (Sonmez, et 
al., 1999; Cavlek, 2002).  
Cavlek (2002) and Sonmez et al. (1999) counsel that at a minimum, a 
destination management task force should include government officials, 
relevant travel, tourism and hospitality professionals (domestic and foreign), 
and community leaders.  They further elaborate that an effective and 
operational plan requires dedication to destination improvement/recovery, 
the ability to exercise appropriate authority, and access to adequate 
resources and financial assistance. While disaster researcher Quarantelli 
(1998) proposes that this process of active cooperation and preparation is 
inherently more valuable than the production of a written plan, some 
tourism proponents recommend the creation of a tourism specific crisis 
management guidebook detailing relevant contacts, responsibilities, agreed 
terminology, useful sample/templates and communications strategies 
(Sonmez, et al. 1999).  Irrespective of the preferred methodology, most 
researchers agree that crisis management endeavours are best instigated 
before the advent of a significant hazard.  
Crisis risk reduction and mitigation 
Based on the experience of countless complacent and ill-prepared 
destinations that have faced a substantial tourism crisis, the majority of 
tourism scholars and industry authorities now promote a proactive approach 
to crisis management, beginning with risk assessment (WTO, 2003; WTTC, 
2003; Gee & Gain, 1986; Sonmez et al., 1999; Glaesser, 2003).  Employing 
various methodologies and means of data analysis, mapping and monitoring, 
such an assessment generally involves an evaluation of risk relative to hazard 
probability and destination vulnerability.  With the existing context as a 
foundation, such calculations should also deliberate on any potential 
physical (environment), social and economic impacts, including anticipated 
losses.
In distinguishing and prioritising all conceivable hazards that may have a 
negative effect on a destination, the risk management process is intended to 
generate strategies and initiatives to minimise potential impacts. Proposed 
structural measures (WHO/EHA, 2002) may involve enforced compliance 
with minimum building standards, effective zoning and infrastructure 
redevelopment, such as transportation networks, airports and medical 
facilities.  Other policies may include partnering with law enforcement 
officials (Sonmez et al., 1999) (e.g. tourist police and foreign intelligence 
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sharing), coordination with media outlets and improved community 
awareness and education. 
Sonmez et al. (1999) again propose that the development and dissemination 
of a clear, comprehensive, crisis management plan/guidebook is one of the 
best visible indications of a destination’s preparedness. The essence of 
proactive risk reduction, mitigation and preparation is that all feasible 
contingencies, including appropriate training, warnings and evacuation 
plans need be regularly addressed and practised.  Less formalised procedures 
may include public education and enhancing local response capabilities, 
flexibility and confidence. Where written documents may exist it is advised 
that details are consistently monitored and reviewed for both relevance and 
accuracy.  Even though such crisis management planning may be developed 
within the context of the tourism sector, it is important that any measures 
and actions undertaken are consistent with broader scale 
emergency/disaster management operations. 
Crisis response
Contrary to the recommendations made as early as the mid-1980s (Gee & 
Gain, 1986), the majority of popular tourist destinations still don’t appear to 
have adequate or effective crisis management planning (Faulkner, 2001; 
Beirman, 2003). Many places, particularly in the developing world, continue 
to lack the skills, resources and capacity to efficiently deal with the onset and 
impacts of any major hazard.  In such cases, the reality of a crisis often 
becomes the catalyst for developing inexperienced, reactive strategies.
While emergency relief and response prioritises the protection of life and 
property in dangerous situations, activities undertaken by the tourism sector 
in the first 24 hours of a crisis are considered crucial (WTO, 2003; WTTC, 
2003).  Irrespective of the level of perceived damage or destruction, 
responsible management requires the maintenance of credibility. Most 
destination case studies support the assertion that honesty, transparency, 
professionalism and good communications with both public and media can 
facilitate faster recovery (WTO, 2003; PATA, 2003; Ritchie, 2004). To 
minimise uncertainty, it is recommended that authorities establish a 
respected spokesperson to immediately address any concerns regarding 
safety and security, and effectively relay both the facts and pertinent issues. 
Beyond any negative imagery and sensationalism by the popular media, 
competent public relations can help provide balance and direction. 
When triggered by a tangible hazard agent, the duration of the subsequent 
emergency period is determined by the context, type, scope, speed of onset, 
and direct impacts of the event (WHO/EHA, 2002).  If the situation is 
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beyond a community’s capacity to cope, the destination may require the 
urgent assistance of external agencies and organisations.  Standard response 
strategies include the establishment of an emergency operations centre with 
an adjunct media/public relations facility. Less critical rehabilitation 
strategies, which may include clearance of debris, utilities restoration, 
facilitating job returns and resumption of commerce, can take weeks or even 
months.  Disputed issues of insurance, liability, ownership and jurisdiction 
also often cause delays.  
Beyond the immediate concerns regarding physical infrastructure, direct 
losses or operational capabilities, to retain visitor numbers and expenditure 
a significantly damaged tourism sector is likely to require rapid and 
extensive recovery strategies (Cavlek, 2002).  Without tourism, many 
destination stakeholders will struggle to resume pre-crisis operational 
capacity and productivity. If an afflicted destination’s tourism sector is to 
remain viable it must restore consumer confidence. 
Recovery from crisis 
The length of any particular crisis and associated recovery period can vary 
substantially.  Impacts are multidimensional and can be difficult to quantify 
or assess including, medical and emotional recovery of victims, economic 
and social losses and physical/environmental damage (Cuny, 1983).  When a 
hazard has compromised public risk perceptions, effective recovery for the 
tourism sector and associated stakeholders requires extensive image 
rebuilding.
The WTO (2003) suggests that at the most fundamental level, the 
management of information and related media should continue to address 
consumer concerns about safety and security.  Subsequent investigations, 
improvements to operational practices and systems, law enforcement and 
preventative measures should similarly be reported on in a timely and 
objective manner. Experience reveals that the diversion of major transport 
carriers, insurance restrictions, and the introduction of international travel 
advisories can be particularly damaging to a destination. 
Reliant on good public relations, an adversely affected tourism destination 
typically needs to embark on new, improved and often aggressive destination 
marketing and promotional campaigns (Bierman, 2003; Glaesser, 2003).  
Negative publicity such as media coverage conveying loss of life, human 
suffering, broad scale disruption and/or extensive damage should be 
amended to provide positive images and impressions. Confidence building 
measures such as celebrity visits, journalist familiarisations and staging 
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international events are often employed to influence the subjective opinions 
and attitudes of potential consumers.  Supplementary actions include the 
diversification of product base, targeting new market segments and 
improving the levels of both quality and competitiveness. (UNEP, 2002)  
While restoring faith in the destination is considered essential for the 
recovery of the tourism sector, it traditionally requires substantive co-
operation, direction and fiscal collaboration.  Without adequate support 
from government, private enterprise and relevant stakeholders, there is no 
guarantee that a damaged tourism sector will be fully rehabilitated.  Given 
the diversity and choices afforded by the industry, it is unrealistic to rely on 
customer loyalty or the natural assets of a destination to re-establish 
conditions following a significant crisis. While discounting and incentives 
may afford short-term gains, commitment and substantial investment are 
considered necessary to ensure that such strategies also produce medium to 
long-term benefits. Effective recovery strategies need to be focused on more 
comprehensive and sustainable outcomes. Consistent with the ISDR (2004) 
definition of disaster recovery the process implies “decisions and actions 
taken after a disaster with a view to restoring or improving the pre-living 
conditions of the stricken community, while encouraging and facilitating 
necessary adjustments to reduce disaster risk” (p. 7). 
In holistic crisis management terms, the recovery process can also provide 
opportunity.   The experiences and lessons learnt should be evaluated and 
utilised to develop improved strategies to mitigate future crisis. For 
destinations that are heavily reliant on tourism, such reforms imply 
significant economic, social and structural investment. Susceptibility may 
also be reduced through improvements to existing facilities, institutions and 
an increase in self sufficiency. 
Sustainable development and tourism 
While a crisis may highlight the underlying vulnerability of any destination 
strongly focused around the tourism industry, the restructuring necessitated 
by crisis recovery can provide the opportunity to adopt a more holistic and 
sustainable approach to tourism and development.  Sustainability implies an 
integrated, participatory process which fairly balances social, economic and 
environmental interests (WTO, 2004; UNEP, 2002).  
Traditionally, tourism development has been driven by governments, 
businesses, corporations and large scale organisations, with limited public 
input or consultation.  While communities may benefit from associated 
infrastructure, employment and income, such enterprises and investments 
are often focused on realising a financial agenda.   Sustainable tourism 
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development ideally accommodates and empowers all interested parties in 
both formal and informal tourism structures. Through an inclusive, 
consultative and coordinated approach to development, it proposes that it is 
possible to secure a more equitable distribution of benefits for all segments 
of the population.
Such development and restructuring within the tourism sector may be 
guided by representative decision making forums including participants 
from the national tourism structures, the police, the public, the business 
community, vendors, tourist information agencies and any other pertinent 
stakeholders.  In achieving effective horizontal and vertical integration, 
resolutions regarding delegation, responsibilities and subsequent 
implementation need to be consensus-based and compatible with 
community goals.  Control, transparency and accountability are considered 
integral to an open process. In addition, construction and/or maintenance of 
an integrated tourism crisis management strategy would be essential. 
Many of the social and economic impacts following a crisis are indicative of 
the extent to which a destination has become reliant on tourism.  When 
committing significant recovery resources into destination marketing, 
promotion and restructuring it is necessary to consider the inherent 
vulnerability of the industry. Adversity resulting from any tourism crisis may 
actually be reduced by less direct dependence on tourism generated income 
and revenues.  Assistance and funding provided to help a destination recover 
may alternatively be used to accomplish other community aspirations and 
priorities, such as improved education and social conditions.  Recommended 
strategies include enhanced self-sufficiency, resilience and diversification of 
the economy (Bloom, 1996). 
Achieving the ideal of social, economic and environmental sustainability 
needs a committed and democratic approach to both development and 
governance.  Extensive understanding, awareness, training and education 
are required at all levels.  The successful operation of sustainable strategies 
and practices in both community development and the tourism sector should 
ultimately reduce a destination’s vulnerability to crisis. 
From theory to practice 
While neither tourism crises or destination vulnerability are new 
phenomena, Robert and Lajtha (2002) assert that crisis management, as a 
science, is still in its infancy largely due to the difficulties in measuring, 
standardising, and comparing one crisis situation with another.  Each hazard 
situation and destination is unique, and as such circumstances may never be 
effectively simulated or replicated.  In developing improved strategies to 
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facilitate destination crisis management, recovery and sustainability it is 
necessary to understand both the relevance and application within a real 
context.  Case studies of afflicted destinations may similarly provide many 
tangible lessons of utility to other vulnerable host communities. 
Bali – a case study of a tourism crisis in a tourist-reliant 
destination
Bali, often referred to as ‘Paradise on Earth’, is a small island located in the 
tropical Indonesian archipelago.  Renowned for its vibrant indigenous 
culture, diverse natural attractions and capacity to cater for almost any class 
and budget of traveller, it rapidly grew into a popular and well patronised 
international tourist destination.  The impact and subsequent events 
triggered by the terrorist bombings of 12 October 2002, rapidly and 
effectively undermined this burgeoning tourism industry.  As the 
vulnerability and socio-economic significance of this sector became more 
apparent, the community of Bali has been faced with a long and difficult road 
to recover from tourism crisis. 
Figure 6.2 Location of the terrorist attacks in Kuta, Bali, 12 October 2002 
Source: Bali SOS, 2002 
The context – tourism reliance and vulnerability 
While travellers’ interest in Bali is not a new phenomenon, the island only 
gained popularity as an international destination during the late 1960s 
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(Kalla, 2003; UNDP, 2003). To further encourage visitor growth, the 
Indonesian government actively pursued tourism-specific development 
plans that included the construction of an international airport.  However, 
through a subsequent lack of public consultation or regulatory control most 
urbanised areas in southern Bali rapidly expanded beyond government 
influence. Locations such as the former fishing village of Kuta/Legian, grew 
to be overcrowded and over-commercialised.  Many rural Balinese and other 
Indonesians enticed by the social and economic prospects of anticipated 
tourism earnings chose to abandon traditional pursuits and activities to 
migrate to such areas.  Through the supply of food, natural and cultural 
attractions, arts, and other commodities and services, most of Bali came to 
benefit from development of this industry.  An increasing reliance on these 
social and economic gains however, also established a significant level of 
dependence on commercial tourism. 
Whether as a legacy of its geographical location or predominant belief in 
karma and harmonious balance; Bali had always been perceived as safe, 
tranquil and immune from the problems and instability that have affected 
other regions (World Bank, 2003).  Residents (with the exception of some 
persistent touters and hawkers) are renowned for their calm friendly attitude 
and easy smiles.  Travel features display images of religious and cultural 
festivities, rice fields, sunsets and extensive accommodation and tourist 
facilities. 
While tropical climate conditions and a diverse terrain mean the island is 
susceptible to natural hazards (including landslides, drought and volcanic 
eruption) it had never been perceived as a high-risk destination.  The 
possibility of travel accidents, disease and transportation delays were 
generally accepted as common hazards of overseas travel. Similarly as the 
island’s residents, businesses and government authorities conducted their 
various daily activities little thought or investment had ever been given to the 
idea of significant crisis. 
Bali in crisis – the trigger and response 
At approximately 11:20pm the night of 12 October 2002 the peace and 
ambience of Bali were shattered by two explosions at crowded nightclubs on 
the popular tourist entertainment strip of Jalan Legian (Legian Street), Kuta.  
In the chaos and destruction that followed it became apparent that the 
emergency services of Bali were ill-prepared and ill-equipped to deal with 
such a disaster (Bali Recovery Group, 2003).  There was no operational 
emergency/crisis management plan - either generic or tourism related.  
Immediate response actions were focused on the basic instinct to protect life 
and property.  Even with the dedication and efforts of available emergency 
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response crews, hospital staff and volunteers, there were numerous fatalities 
(a final death toll of 202), mass casualties of varying severity, and extensive 
physical damage.  With victims from 22 countries and rampant speculation 
of terrorism, this incident quickly gained a high profile and global media 
status.  Images and stories of the carnage, the extensive devastation, 
inadequate medical facilities and raw emotion were rapidly and prominently 
presented on television, radio, in print and via the Internet. 
Overwhelmed Indonesian government authorities were quick to express 
sympathies and reassure visitors of personal safety, but were unable to 
successfully control or direct the ensuing media reports. Lacking a singular 
spokesperson or media centre any credibility was effectively undermined by 
instances of confusion and contradiction. Local community groups instituted 
street patrols while official safety measures and crime investigations were 
implemented by both the police and military. As financial aid, medical 
expertise and technical assistance was made available from around the 
world, the Bali Recovery Group (a coordination committee of existing local 
non-government organisations), was created with the aim to deliver the best 
services, collect data and minimise duplication of effort.  With most of the 
immediate medical needs soon assuaged, official strategies began to focus on 
the clean up and restoration of vital functions of the community. 
Figure 6.3 Aerial view of the damage caused by the explosions at Paddy’s 
Bar and the Sari Club 
Source: courtesy of Steve Palmer, November 2002 
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Rehabilitation: short-term initiatives 
While formal efforts were made to remove and analyse the structural debris 
it became quickly apparent that the explosions were planned by terrorists, 
intentionally and specifically targeting tourism in the area. International 
travel warnings/bans were immediately upgraded as most of the remaining 
tourists abandoned the island and surrounding region.  Already affected by 
the economic slowdown caused by the 1998 election riots and the 11 
September 2001 attack on the World Trade Center, Bali was effectively 
plunged into a tourism crisis (Kalla, 2003; Karyadi, 2003; World Bank, 
2003).  In a period that traditionally coincided with peak season, direct 
tourist arrivals dropped, occupancy rates decreased to single figures and 
associated earnings plummeted.  Residents struggling with the emotional, 
psychological and even physical effects of the bombing were now faced with 
the disruption of their livelihoods. 
In the days and weeks that followed all stakeholders were genuine and 
concerted in their efforts to minimise the socio-economic impacts.  
Government measures focused on a commitment to security and law 
enforcement, tourism promotion and the provision of a social safety net 
(World Bank, 2003). The Bali Recovery Group (2003) worked 
predominantly towards direct victim and family support – medical, financial 
and educational.  Most hotels and businesses laboured toward the 
resumption of services and the restoration of Bali’s tourist image, although 
efforts were rarely coordinated. Meanwhile, individuals and families within 
the community were forced to implement short-term coping mechanisms 
such as return migration to the villages, selling assets, reducing household 
expenditure and accessing savings. While there were growing concerns about 
reprisals against Muslims and related ethnic tension, few incidents were 
reported.  Special non-denominational religious ‘cleansing’ rituals were held 
to help restore balance to both the physical and spiritual world. 
As foreign visitor arrivals remained low in early 2003, successful marketing 
strategies led to an increase in domestic visitors and an expansion of the 
Asian market segment (UNDP, 2003).  Air Paradise, a locally owned airline, 
commenced flights to Australia in an effort to help revive visitor numbers. 
Locally and regionally, security became the top priority as a new policing 
policy focused on greater visibility and upgrades to existing measures at all 
ports of entry. Several international events and tourist operator/journalist 
familiarisations were also presented to increase the profile of Bali and 
assurances of safety and security. Despite such strategies, businesses and the 
community continued to suffer. As operational costs surpassed income, 
hotels, restaurants, shop fronts and transport providers faced closure and/or 
bankruptcies.  
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Residents experienced job cut-backs, unemployment/underemployment, 
income reduction and diminishing social standards. As reduced business and 
tourism revenues resulted in less expendable income for the communities of 
popular resort areas, residents were forced to change their usage and 
consumption habits. The effects and influence of such reduced spending 
gradually spread throughout the island’s economy and conditions in the 
poorer areas of Bali deteriorated; this is sometimes referred to as the ‘ripple 
effect’.  
Figure 6.4 Tourism crisis – a deserted hotel pool-side in Kuta, January 
2003
Reconstruction to recovery 
As mandatory work permits and hotel accreditation standards were 
introduced to improve accountability, international travel concerns 
regarding the risk of contracting SARS and the war in Iraq seem to have 
minimised any initial improvements in direct visitor arrivals. While the 
national government introduced new anti-terrorism initiatives and secured 
the convictions of the Bali bombers, the August 2003 terrorist bombing of 
the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta quickly undermined any progress regarding 
perceptions of improved safety. Despite such events and the continued travel 
advisories, by the end of the year visitor numbers were increasing and 
gradual improvements occurred in tourism business prospects.  The one-
year anniversary of the attacks and associated memorial services successfully 
attracted much international media attention and publicity, yet for many it 
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only revived the issue of terrorism rather than promoted the merits of the 
island.
January 2004 was a record month for foreign visitor arrivals to Bali, but 
closer investigation of the associated socio-economic statistics revealed a 
different story.  Benefiting from the discounts, sales and bonus incentives 
offered by tourism providers, visitors were actually staying for shorter 
periods of time and spending less money, minimising business profit 
margins. The Indonesian Government’s controversial introduction of a new 
visa fee in February 2004 was met with further disdain by both consumers 
and operators.  As few of the post-bombing donor agencies remained 
operational in Bali, many community members were forced to sell more 
personal possessions and property as a means of coping. A large number of 
the programs introduced to increase economic diversification and social 
support eventually collapsed due to lack of adequate investment, 
commitment and finances.   Numerous reports have suggested that through 
this experience of shared adversity many traditional and familial support 
networks were strengthened (Hitchcock & Darma Putra, 2005).  While 
tourist numbers suggested a return to pre-crisis levels, a further bombing 
outside the Australian Embassy in Jakarta in September 2004, again added 
uncertainty to a delicate market.   
While the devastating Indian Ocean tsunami on 26 December 2004 did not 
directly impact on the island of Bali, many tourist operators reported that 
subsequent cancellations were caused by a geographical association with the 
Indonesian province of Aceh.  As former recipients of aid, the empathetic 
community and non-government organisations of Bali reactivated many 
support networks to provide resources and assistance for the tsunami 
victims. With a return of economic stability for many residents, programs 
were also established to support more local community health centres and 
improved access to public education.  Whether as a consequence of 
successful marketing and promotion, the inherent attributes of the island or 
a diminishing risk perception, in 2005 there were unprecedented numbers of 
direct visitor arrivals to Bali. Even the controversy surrounding several high 
profile ‘foreigner’ drug cases failed to dissuade most tourists.   While this 
new market segment consisted of less long-haul European and North 
American tourists, Australians had again returned to this popular 
‘playground’ supplemented with travellers from throughout regional Asia. 
For many Balinese this restoration of business and profits heralded the end 
of a difficult period. 
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Crisis revisited  
During September 2005 the highest ever number of direct arrivals was 
recorded (Table 6.1), but on 1 October 2005 the island was again subjected to 
the tragedy of tourist-focused terrorism.  Although the explosions in 
restaurants of Kuta Square and Jimberan Bay were significantly smaller (25 
fatalities) than the previous incident, subsequent international media 
attention was quick to surmise a pattern for premeditated violence against 
tourists.  Having learnt from past experience, medical personnel and 
authorities were quick to respond, establishing an emergency centre at the 
Sanglah Hospital with an effective media capacity.  The Chief of Indonesian 
Police General Made Pastika, who had been seen as responsible for capturing 
the perpetrators of previous bombings, was quickly presented as the official 
spokesman to address questions and make any formal statements.  Familiar 
with the potential needs of the victims and their families, community-based 
volunteer and support networks were assisting within the hour.  
While travel advisories were reinstated and large numbers of tourist chose to 
avoid Bali, cancellations were not as dramatic as following the 2002 attacks.  
Maintaining occupancy rates of between 40-50% many analysts have drawn 
the cautious conclusion that perhaps the travelling public are becoming more 
accepting of terrorism as a risk of modern day travel.  As visible safety and 
security again became a high priority, the Bali Hotel Association together 
with several other private enterprise stakeholders made substantial financial 
commitments to supplement security upgrades. Despite the level of 
destination loyalty, lower visitor numbers again precipitated socio-economic 
hardship for the host community, exacerbated by the subsequent collapse of 
the locally owned airline, Air Paradise.  With international uncertainty 
regarding the probability of further attacks, many have also been critical of 
Indonesian government’s slow commitment to Bali’s tourism recovery 
efforts.  With profits and revenues again lagging the Governor of Bali 
formally announced the establishment of a Bali Security Council in October 
2005 with membership including the police, military, academics, non-
governmental agencies, government bureaucrats, and community leaders.  
Part of this group’s responsibility is intended to support a wide range of 
tourism promotion, recovery and security issues. 
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Table 6.1 Direct foreign tourist arrivals in Bali 2001-2005 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
January 92,604 87,027 60,836 104,062 101,931 
February 104,083 96,267 67,469 84,374 100,638 
March 110,582 113,553 72,263 99,644 117,149 
April 109,634 104,960 53,726 111,021 116,272 
May 103,939 119,284 47,858 117,191 116,615 
June 122,352 130,563 81,256 131,685 136,369 
July 142,946 147,033 111,828 148,086 158,453 
August 144,324 160,420 115,546 155,000 157,229 
September 104,008 150,747 106,763 141,900 162,102 
October 129,932 81,100 97,435 128,297 81,109 
November 110,145 31,517 83,853 110,471 62,705 
December 102,290 63,393 94,196 125,376 75,877 
Total 1,376,839 1,285,864 993,029 1,457,107 1,386,449
Source: BPS Statistics Indonesia, 2006 
Table 6.1 indicates the fluctuations in visitor numbers which reflect the 
market sensitivity to external events such as the 11 September 2001 attacks, 
the 12 October 2002 bombings, SARS, the Jakarta bombings and further 
attacks on 1 October 2005. 
Lessons in crisis management and recovery 
While Bali has a unique context, it presents many lessons of value to any 
popular tourist destination.  As Australian tourists comprised a significant 
proportion of victims in both terrorist attacks, the Australian Government 
and national tourism authorities have also been forced to face the reality that 
terrorism can happen to anybody, anywhere and anytime. The most 
apparent message from this experience is that no destination should 
consider itself immune to crisis and that preparation and proactive capacity 
building are more effective than complacency.  Irrespective of the type of 
hazard agent or crisis trigger, there are some universal tenets to effective 
crisis management.  Consistent with the recommendations of peak industry 
bodies such as the WTO, WTTC and PATA - safety and security, 
communication, promotion and marketing are integral to positive image and 
consumer confidence.  It may not always be possible to prevent a crisis yet 
the duration and adverse impacts may be minimised. 
In responding to the first terrorist attacks Bali had limited skills, experience 
or even adequate medical facilities.  Although the physical impact area was 
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small and security was rapidly improved, the media, officials and even 
tourism operators failed to convince potential consumers of their personal 
safety. Subsequent promotion and marketing based on discounts and 
incentives, while numerically successful, also reduced profit margins.   
Securing an increase in the domestic and regional market segment to sustain 
the industry through times of hardship was perhaps one of the most 
productive tourism strategies. While tourism arrivals gradually increased 
towards 2005, the influence of numerous external events served to reinforce 
the erratic and often fickle nature of tourism. Lacking the requisite 
infrastructure and resources for greater economic diversification the host-
community of Bali has been forced to become more adaptable, resilient and 
self-sufficient.  Although the level of tourism reliance remains high, obvious 
improvements in the response to the second series of attacks reveal a vast 
improvement in both management and coping capacity.  Consistent with the 
concept of enhanced sustainability further time will reveal the success of 
current endeavour towards greater stakeholder integration, participation 
and collaboration.  
Conclusion
Like many destinations throughout the world, the tourism industry in Bali 
was developed in a generally unsustainable manner. While prosperity 
generated significant opportunities, limited consideration was given to the 
risks of market instability and growing levels of socio-economic reliance.  
Faced with the reality of tourism crisis and adversity, this unsuspecting host 
community was forced to adopt purely reactive response strategies.  Lacking 
the relevant experience, knowledge and skills, the popular tourist island Bali 
has experienced a difficult path to re-establish its market stability.  As 
unrelenting external events have reaffirmed the inherent vulnerability of any 
popular destination and its stakeholders, an improved resilience and coping 
capacity demonstrates the value of employing effective formal and informal 
crisis management strategies.
